justice system was not limited to criminal investigatory procedures and protection of the rights of the accused at trial. Breaking with prior law and practice, 6 federal courts also started reviewing individual prisoner petitions alleging violation of constitutional rights, and, by the end of the decade, they began intervening in the policies and affairs of state correctional facilities. 7 In this area of criminal procedure as well as in those surrounding the investigatory and trial stages, the more controversial innovations have begun to shift from definition of the right to more detailed explication of the remedy required once a violation of the right has been found.
Pugh v. Locke, 8 a recent decision of the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, exemplifies this new remedial activism on the part of the federal judiciary that results when the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is given broad scope. 9 Thus, Pugh's significance begins with its uniquely clear and expansive holding that the confinement conditions facing the aggregate prison population of a state could violate the eighth amendment. This extension of the constitutional mandate to cover overall conditions of confinement, coupled with the finding in Pugh that Alabama's prison system violated that mandate, required Chief Judge Johnson to enlarge the scope of the ultimate federal remedy for unconstitutional punishment. He ordered Alabama prison officials to conform to minutely detailed minimum constitutional standards for prison conditions, and he undertook to monitor the entire prison system to assure compliance. No prior federal court had involved itself s deeply in the administration of a state prison system.
Given the generally deplorable conditions in many correctional facilities in the United States, 10 this development poses serious and important legal issues for aggrieved inmates, prison officials and public policymakers. Moreover, in light of the questions of federalism raised by a United States district court's revamping of an entire state prison system, the decision has even broader implications for the federal adjudication of civil rights generally. This Article examines the doctrinal and remedial alternatives suggested by the prison cases, and particularlyPugh v. Locke, in light of recent Supreme Court restrictions on federal court intervention in state administrative affairs. After a brief discussion of Pugh and of the federalism issues surrounding that case, the Article turns to the body of law interpreting the eighth amendment in the prison context and then to the specific remedies ordered in Pugh in order to implement that law. Finally, the Article concludes with-an examination of the propriety of federal judicial supervision of state prison systems, both in terms of federalism concerns and in light of the more traditional debate over the appropriate role of the judiciary in a democratic society.
I. Pugh v. Locke-A SYNOPSIS
An understanding of the innovations in the constitutional theory and the intrusiveness of the remedial program developed in Pugh requires a review of the case and its holding. The plaintiffs in Pugh, present and future inmates of Alabama state penal institutions," sued, in their individual and official capacities, the Governor of Alabama, the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and members of the Alabama Board of Corrections, and the wardens of two state correctional facilities, 1 2 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for deprivation of rights under the eighth and I 4 th amendments.' 3 The court's memorandum opinion consisted Some are grossly understaffed and underequipped--conspicuous products of public indifference. Overcrowding and idleness are the salient features of some, brutality and corruption of a few others. Far too few are well organized and adequately funded. Juvenile institutions tend to be better, but also vary greatly. The local jails and workhouses that handle most misdemeanants are generally the most inadequate in every way." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT : CORRECTIONS 4 (1967) .
In fact, the term "correctional" may be a misnomer. For discussion of this issue, see, e.g., Robbins, Learning by Redoing (Book Review), 77 COLUM. L. REV. 153 (1977) ; Robbins, Brothers of Gulag (Book Review), 62 VA. L. REV. 462, 464-65, 468 & n.36 (1976) .
11. 4o6 F. Supp. at 32 x. The suit was brought as a class action under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) and 2 3 (b)(2).
12. 4o6 F. Supp. at 321. 13. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (970): "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
The Supreme Court applied the eighth amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment to the states through the 14th amendment in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o (1962) .
primarily of a litany of undisputed facts concerning the conditions in the state's four principal correctional facilities. 14 Foremost among these facts was severe overcrowding, which the court found to be "primarily responsible for . . . all the other ills of Alabama's penal system."' 5 For example, the lack of adequate facilities mandated the total abnegation of a prisoner classification system, 1 6 so that the io percent of the prison population known to be psychotic1 7 as well as many others known to be violently disposed were dispersed throughout the several prisons. 1 8 The court also found that the physical plants, electrical wiring, heating, plumbing, and ventilation were in disrepair and that the decrepit facilities promoted the "gross infestation" of vermin. 9 Food service equipment and storage and preparation techniques were unsanitary, and personal hygiene among inmates presented "an insurmountable problem." 20 Further, overworked prison personnel contributed considerably to "the rampant violence and jungle atmosphere." 2 ' Finally, the court characterized the vocational, educational, work, and recreational programs available to Alabama state prisoners as "totally inadequate to provide reasonable opportunities for rehabilitation-or even to prevent physical and mental deterioration--of most of the inmate population." 2 2 On the basis of these findings, the court concluded that " [t] he living conditions in Alabama prisons constitute [d] cruel and unusual punishment." 2 3 In response to the ubiquitous ills that plagued the Alabama prisons, the court devised an equally all-encompassing remedy. First, it promulgated a detailed set of "Minimum Constitutional Standards for Inmates of 14. 406 F. Supp. at 322-28. The cases were submitted on evidence offered at trial, as well as on depositions, briefs and more than i,ooo stipulated facts. See id. at 322.
15; Id. at 323. The court noted that at the time of trial some 3,550 inmates were incarcerated in the four major Alabama penal institutions designed to house a maximum of 2,307 inmates. PAPILLON (1970) . 20. 4o6 F. Supp. at 323. A United States public health officer toured the four main Alabama facilities and found them "wholly unfit for human habitation according to virtually every criterion used for evaluation by public health inspectors." Id. at 323-24. This officer testified that, if such facilities were under his jurisdiction, he would recommend that they be closed and condemned "as an imminent danger to the health of the individuals exposed to them."
Id. at 324 Alabama Penal System" 24 and ordered the defendants to report to the court in 6 months concerning "their programs in the implementation of each and every standard." ' 2 s The court also ordered the state to form a Human Rights Committee for the Alabama Prison System to monitor the implementation of the standards. 2 6 Finally, the court placed the defendant state officials "on notice that failure to comply with the minimum standards . . . will necessitate the closing of those several prison facilities herein found to be unfit for human confinement." 2 7 Taken together, these requirements constituted the most ambitious federal court intervention in the field of corrections.
II. COUNTER TRENDS NEW AND OLD:
PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISM AND EXPERTISE Although federal courts previously had threatened to close penal facilities and had required prison officials to report on their continuing progress, 28 none before Pugh had declared, for example, that the Constitution guarantees each inmate 6o square feet of living space or a sink with hot and cold running water in his cell. 29 And few courts had divested state officials so completely of primary authority for running a state institution.
Not so long ago, however, the Pugh court's remedy might have been viewed as a logical step toward the protection of federally guaranteed rights against recalcitrant state officials. The school desegregation cases had set ample precedent for federal intervention in activities traditionally left within the province of the states, 3 6 and the Supreme Court not only had permitted but also had mandated imaginative expansion of federal equity powers to deal with deprivations of constitutional rights. 3 1 Recently, however, the Supreme Court has reversed this trend and shown a new concern with principles of federalism in dealing with state ("[T] he remedy for such segregation may be administratively awkward, inconvenient and even bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim period when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual school system."); note 49 infra.
prohibited federal courts from enjoining pending state criminal prosecutions under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 3 3 Since Younger, the Court has extended its prohibition of federal court interference in state courts to cases involving state civil proceedings that are similar to criminal prosecutions, such as state nuisance actions against pornographic theaters. 3 4 Most recently, in Rizzo v. Goode, 3 the Court held that a federal district court exceeded its authority in requiring that the Philadelphia Police Department draft and submit guidelines for dealing with civilian complaints of constitutional violations. In so doing, the Court noted that "the principles of federalism which play such an important part in governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments" 3 6 govern requests for injunctions not only against state judicialproceedings but against "those in charge of. . .an agency of state or local governments" 3 7 as well.
Although Rizzo probably rests most firmly on the Court's alternative holding that no cause of action had been shown under section 1983,38 its broad federalism dicta portend a Court bent on limiting federal intervention against state officials. Moreover, unlike the Pugh court's order, containing detailed instructions and requiring the establishment of a committee with broad powers of oversight, 3 9 the remedy overturned in Rizzo merely ordered the police department to draft and implement guidelines.
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Rizzo's concern for principles of federalism may have additional vitality in the prison context in light of the hands-off approach 41 that traditionally has precluded federal courts from entertaining state prisoners' allegations of unconstitutional treatment. 42 The concept was predicated upon the belief that the inmate was a "slave of the State" 4 3 who had no rights for the 33. 42 U.S. C. § 1983 (197o) , quoted in note 13 supra. 34. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975 the hands-off doctrine remains atmospherically important to the initial determination of the need for as well as the degree of intervention. In sum, the holding in Pugh can withstand the doubts cast upon it by Rizzo and reinforced in the prison context by the traditional hands-off approach only upon a showing that it is intrinsically different from Rizzo either because of the strength of the precedential value of modern prison cases, the newly developing strictures of the eighth amendment or the fact that no other remedy is available to the court.
III. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT:
THE DETERMINATION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT In order to understand the lengths traveled by the Pugh court in fashioning the remedy, it is first necessary to advert to the breadth of the constitutional harm found by the court. Understanding the harm in turn requires some knowledge of the doctrinal train of events culminating in the finding that the totality of the conditions of confinement facing prisoners could constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
A. Three Doctrinal Approaches to Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Although the origin of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" is well-established, 54 its original meaning has been obfuscated. The earliest American courts to consider the matter equated cruelty with "something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."" The more modern American attitude toward cruel and unusual punishment emanates from Weems v. United States. 5 8 This case involved an accessory in the falsification of a public document, who was punished with a 12-tO-20 year sentence at hard labor with ankle and wrist chains and the perpetual loss of civil rights. The Supreme Court found the punishment excessive, declaring that the humanitarian leitmotiv of the eighth amendment was not to be hampered by the common law's traditional allowance of brutal penalties. 5 9 It is also now settled that the term "punishments" is construed to include not only statutorily imposed sentences, but ad hoc sanctions meted out by prison officials as well. 60 ChiefJustice Burger has noted, in fact, that "[j]udicial findings of impermissible cruelty have been limited, for the most part, to offensive punishments devised without specific authority by prison officials, not by legislatures." 6 1 Further, as exemplified in Pugh v. Locke, "punishments" is interpreted to embrace conditions of incarceration that affect an entire prison population simply as a consequence of confinement. In recent years, courts predominantly have employed three somewhat overlapping approaches to determine the presence of cruel and unusual punishment: whether the punishment "shocks the conscience," whether it is disproportionate to the offense committed and whether it is in excess of a legitimate penajaim. 63 Each approach, however, suffers from severe ded; as, in treasons of all kinds, being drawn or dragged to the place of execution; in high treason affecting the king's person or government, emboweling alive, beheading, and quartering; and in murder, a public dissection. And, in case of any treason committed by a female, the judgment is to be burned alive. But the humanity of the English nation has authorized, by a tacit consent, an almost general mitigation of such parts of these judgments as savour of torture or cruelty .... Some punishments consist in exile or banishment, others in loss of liberty, by perpetual or temporary imprisonment. Some extend to confiscation, others induce a disability. Some, though rarely, occasion a mutilation or dismembering, by cutting off the hand or ears, others fix a last stigma on the offender, by slitting the nostrils, or branding in the hand or cheek." 57. doctrinal and historical limitations that make it virtually irrelevant in the context of an eighth amendment examination of the totality of prison conditions. A brief description and analysis of the three approaches will indicate why the courts that have based massive remedial measures on the unconstitutionality of particularly abject prison conditions have abandoned these approaches in search of new ones.
i. Punishment that shocks the conscience.
The "shock the conscience" test has been the standard most extensively applied to determine the constitutionality of particular punishments. Pursuant to this approach, the court bases its holding of unconstitutionality on a "cry of horror" 64 at punishment that is "so foul, so inhuman and so violative of basic concepts of decency" that it shocks the conscience of the court. 6' This standard, which has been criticized as being overly subjective for purposes of a constitutional test, 66 is indicative of an evolutionary theory of punishment, without which the eighth amendment would provide little modern protection. 67 Despite its flexibility, however, the "shock the conscience" test is effective only when the features of confinement are so readily discernible as to evoke predictable human affections. A, §'ecorfd, less prevalent, approach used to ascertain the presence of cruel and unusual punishment compares the sanction imposed with the act perpetrated to determine whether the punishment is excessive. 70 Because 68. For example, psychological extirpation, which prisons are quite capable of causing, may involve greater anguish to the victim than many forms of corporal punishment. The Supreme Court broached this subject in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), holding that the use of denationalization as a punishment was barred by the eighth amendment. The Court stated that " [t] here may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development." Id. at ioi (plurality opinion per Warren, C.J.). Although the Chief Justice was speaking only for a plurality (with Justices Black, Douglas and Whittaker), a majority of the Court referred approvingly to these words in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) . See id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 269-70 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 n. 1 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 327 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); accord, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 208 (2d Cir. i97) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) ("true inhumanity seeks to destroy the psyche rather than merely the body") (Feinberg, J., dissenting and concurring). See also I A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 1918 ARCHIPELAGO -1956 69. Perhaps the reason for this discrepancy is that we do not, and, perhaps, cannot know the least common denominators for security or discipline or what factors can be said with certitude to promote rehabilitation. Cf., e.g., Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 430-31 (D. Md. 1966) , cert. dnied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967) (27 hours in isolation during which prisoner allegedly was forced to go naked and to lie on a cold concrete floor without a mattress or blankets in temperature of about 40 degrees and an additional 16 days of semisegregation held not to be cruel and unusual punishment, because the inmate's violations of rules had threatened prison order). From a different, societal, perspective, the "shock the conscience" test also suffers from the possibility that what a lay person may consider brutal is essential for the maintenance of prison security, discipline or the promotion of rehabilitation. As one court has noted: "Even a lifetime of study in prison administration and several advanced degrees in the field would not qualify us as a fidral court to command state officials to shun a policy that they have decided is suitable because to us the choice may seem unsound orpersonally repugnant." Sostre v. May 1977] this test was developed in cases involving the trial judge's or prison official's discretionary power in imposing specific sanctions, generally increasing those already meted out at sentencing, 7 1 it is particularly inappropriate in evaluating ongoing conditions of confinement for the general prison population. Challenges to a cumulation of prison conditions that daily affect the inmate community and that do not include the imposition of extra punishments following particular transgressions of prison regulations cannot profitably draw on this essentially transactional theory.
Punishment in excess of a legitimate penal aim.
Under the third approach to determining the existence of cruel and unusual punishment, a composite of the "shock the conscience" and "excessiveness" tests, "a punishment may be cruel and unusual when, although applied in pursuit of a legitimate penal aim, it goes beyond what is necessary to achieve that aim; that is, when a punishment is unnecessarily cruel in view of the purpose for which it is used. "72 This standard still considers the degree of brutality, but, having found punishment or confinement conditions to be shocking, it compares the justification for the punishment imposed. Government personnel have the burden of defending prison policies with reference to legitimate penal objectives. Theoretically, this burden ensures the expert presentation of objective data, so that the court may rule on more than a purely moral or "gut reaction" basis.
As with the other two tests, this balancing, or "punishment in excess of legitimate penal aim" test, involves significant problems in the context of overall prison conditions. First, it primarily addresses disciplinary sanctions, rather than the nondiscretionary toleration of conditions of confinement. Second, in the broad context of the totality of conditions facing a prisoner, the conceptions of penal aims relied upon by this third cruel and unusual punishment formulation become themselves so general 74 that the expertise and objective data available in the context of more individual punishments will not be available. The test, therefore, becomes even more amorphous and subjective than the ones it replaces, for it then amounts to the balancing of two imponderables: the judge's shocked conscience and the penological justification for imprisonment. Third, although this test might seem burdensome for the prison officials involved, in practice the courts often defer to the officials' statements of need, rather than face the multitude of problems involved in any general attack on prison-wide conditions. 7 ' Thus, serious question exists whether this test is consonant with the general theory of cruel and unusual punishment, or whether it constitutes a "gross distortion" of the eighth amendment. At its base, the test is a derivative of the I 4 th amendment substantive due process analysis commonly applied in prisoner cases involving first amendment rights. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974) 74. With individual punishments, the question of state justification is a matter subject to expertise and objective data. But in cases involving the totality of conditions of confinement, the state's penological justification necessarily broadens, and the debate rarely will stop short of questioning the very concept of prison itself, a matter clearly beyond the expertise of the courts. Despite the inadequacy of these three approaches to cruel and unusual punishments, the courts have not hesitated to use them. 77 Just as often, however, especially of late, they have ignored them and used basically inductive reasoning from factual findings 78 in order to find that certain particularly vile prison conditions violate the Constitution. The courts have been more likely to use the three approaches in cases of individual deprivations, and they have found it easiest to make the inductive leap from the facts to a finding of unconstitutionality in cases in which the offending conditions are systemic and widespread. The pervasiveness of these conditions in turn often has inflated the scope of the remedy ordered by the court. To understand those remedies it is crucial, therefore, to analyze the prison conditions that have prompted these judicial findings of cruel and unusual punishment.
B. Conditions of Confinement as Per Se Violations of the Eighth Amendment:
The Search for a More Practical Doctrine i. The "totality of conditions" approach: a first step.
Judicial holdings that conditions of confinement are per se violative of the eighth amendment 7 9 are relatively new in the development of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Not only does this recent doctrinal development threaten to replace the three traditional approaches under the eighth amendment, at least in prison conditions litigation; it also warrants more adventuresome remedies. The decision in Holt v. Sarver 8 " initiated the new trend by holding that a cumulation of conditions might constitute cruel and unusual punishment. and an absence of rehabilitation programs 8 7 as conditions that "do not rise to constitutional dignity but which aggravate the more serious prison defects and deficiencies," the court tentatively brought the more prosaic conditions of confinement within the ken of eighth amendment review. 88 Although tracking its language, subsequent courts did not immediately adopt the Holt court's approach of examining the totality of routine prison-wide conditions. Instead, they typically cited Holt in scrutinizing the subset of those conditions that were specifically designed for prison discipline 8 9 and in cases involving unconvicted pretrial detainees in local jails. 90 Pugh v. Locke, therefore, was the first case to emulate 82. "The distinguishing aspects of Arkansas penitentiary life must be considered together. One cannot consider separately a trusty system, a system in which men are confined together in large numbers in open barracks, bad conditions in the isolation cells, or an absence of a meaningful program of rehabilitation. All of those things exist in combination; each affects the other; and taken together they have a cumulative impact on the inmates regardless of their status." 309 F. Supp. at 373.
83. Highlighting this situation were a brutal "trusty" system and open-barrack sleeping arrangements. The Arkansas prisons primarily depended on armed inmate trusties for prison discipline: "The reasons for penological disapproval of the use of trusty guards are that it creates an unhealthy prison climate and atmosphere; it breeds fear and hatred between the guards, on the one hand, and those guarded, on the other hand; it tends to be brutal and to endanger the lives of inmates who live and work 'under the guns' of other convicts; and it leads to other abuses." Id. See id. at 373-76. Open barracks sleeping arrangements were found to encourage sexual attacks and other forms of violence. "The undisputed evidence is to the effect that within the last 18 months there have been 17 stabbings at Cummins, all but one of them taking place in the barracks, and four of them producing fatal results. Holt's attention to the more typical and pervasive conditions that exist in many of the prisons throughout this country. 9 1 In fact, Pugh went considerably beyond Holt both by reaching a similar result without singling out any particularly important prison conditions 9 2 and by moving toward a definition of the essential components of unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
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By finally concretizing the meaning of Holt in a case truly involving the overall prison setting and carefully analyzing conditions likely to recur in American penitentiaries, Pugh's holding that an aggregation of conditions of confinement violates the eighth amendment poses pressing new questions for both the judiciary and the state officials subject to federal court jurisdiction. Primary among these questions is how far the courts must go to remedy the pervasive conditions that contribute to a finding of unconstitutionality, especially in light of the limits that federalism places on how far they may go. Before reaching that question, however, both judges and prison officials must determine the types, degrees and number of prison conditions necessary to trigger the prohibition of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Although the answer to this question is an equation replete with variables, 9 4 there is one constant, suggested by Pugh Cit. 1976 A careful reading of Pugh 9 6 as well as the volume of cases that have applied Holt in the solitary confinement and pretrial detainee contexts reveals I i aspects of institutional management that commonly comprise the conditions of confinement relevant to the constitutionality of a prison system and that provided the basis for the court's order in Pugh. 9 Because in most cases no single factor will rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the court's remedy must address them all, as does the succeeding analysis.
Physical facilities. A major amount of recent judicial scrutiny of prisons has focused on the health and safety hazards as well as overwhelming inconvenience and annoyance caused by inoperative equipment and other substandard physical facilities. 9 8 In addition to conditions that threaten imminent danger, the courts have looked at improper electrical wiring that results in insufficient illumination, 9 9 inadequate and malfunctioning toilet and sewage systems that pose severe health problems, 1 0 0 insufficient 
(1972).
Although in speaking of the latter, duration element, many courts appear to refer to conditions attendant to solitary confinement, this indicium remains relevant in scrutinizing the overall conditions of confinement. This relevance is especially visible in light of the great weight the courts have placed on the effect of such conditions as solitary punishment on the general quality of prison life. washing and showering appurtenances, 10 1 and heating and ventilation inadequacies directly attributable to decrepit facilities.102
Overcrowding. Courts, including Pugh, frequently have cited overcrowding as the one factor aggravating all other conditions of confinement and producing the most harmful physical and mental consequences.
10 3 In addition to exacerbating other conditions, overcrowding may be directly responsible for the lack of a prison classification system 10 4 or failure to protect inmates from assault by fellow prisoners. 105 Absence of a classification system. The absence of a system of classifying the inmates, in fact, is an important yardstick by which courts have measured conditions of confinement. Establishment of such a system accomplishes four objectives. First, it properly separates pretrial detainees from convicted offenders.' 06 Second, it segregates the physically or mentally ill from the general inmate population.' 0 7 Third, it removes misdemeanants and juvenile offenders from potentially destructive contact with felony offenders. ' Finally, it sequesters violent inmates from young and weak prisoners prone to assault or sexual abuse. 1 0 9
Isolation and segregation cells. [r] he indescribable conditions in the isolation cells required immediate action to protect inmates from any further torture by confinement in those cells. As many as six inmates were packed in four foot by eight foot cells with no beds, no lights, no running water, and a hole in the floor for a toilet which could only be flushed from the outside. The infamous Draper 'doghouse' is a separate building, locked from the outside, with no guard stationed inside. Inmates in punitive isolation received only one meal per day, frequently without utensils. They were permitted no exercise or reading material and could shower only every i i days. Punitive isolation has been used to punish inmates for offenses ranging from swearing at guards and failing to report to work on time, to murder."
112. See, e.g 948 (1975) . The evidence in that case showed, amongst many other horrors, that a 19-year-old with an extremely high fever who was diagnosed as having acute pneumonia was left unobserved and allowed to take cold showers at will for 2 days before his death; a quadriplegic with bedsores infested with maggots was bathed and had his bandages changed only once in the month before his death; a geriatric inmate who had suffered a stroke was made to sit each day on a wooden bench, so that he would not soil his bed-he frequently fell onto the floor, and his legs became swollen from a lack of circulation, necessitating the amputation of a leg the day before his death. Id. at 285. The court entered a comprehensive order designed to remedy each specific abuse proved at trial, and to establish additional safeguards, so that the medical program at the Alabama prisons would never again regress to its past level of inadequacy. Pugh, Holt and similar cases clearly point the direction of a new doctrinal approach to eighth amendment adjudication in the prison context. They begin with the insight that the lack of a singular unconstitutional condition of confinement should not dispose of the question of a prison's compliance with the ban on cruel and unusual punishment; the totality of the conditions of confinement must be examined both in its detail and, when relevant, in its duration. Next, these cases embody i I relatively general questions that a reviewing court should ask about the conditions of the challenged prison system focusing particularly on the adequacy of medical treatment, hygiene, sanitation, and means of prevent- ing violence. But having isolated these numerous and common features of prison institutions that together may violate the Constitution, the courts have failed to elucidate a precise formula or even reflect a clear pattern in converting their variegated findings into eighth amendment holdings. Nonetheless, several relatively settled conclusions may be drawn from the doctrinal development. First, the "totality of conditions" approach, although perhaps no less elusive than the concepts of humanity and penological justification that characterized the three more traditional eighth amendment approaches discussed earlier, 138 clearly responds more adequately to the expansive inquiry necessitated in examining the cruelty and unusualness of punishment in American prisons. Further, plaintiff prisoners preparing causes of action under the eighth amendment would be well advised to employ a multifaceted presentation to take advantage of the fact that under the Holt-Pugh approach a combination of unsatisfactory conditions will be more likely to succeed than will any single factor. Finally, and most importantly, should the plaintiff succeed, the federal district court must face the complex problem of fashioning a workable means, within the confines of federalism, of enforcing minimal constitutional standards for conditions of confinement against a large state agency.
IV. REMEDYING UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF MINIMAL CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
The federal district courts have drawn upon venerable forms of equitable relief and developed more imaginative and sweeping ones in response to the cruel and unusual punishment clause's new application to the totality of prison conditions. Even before Pugh advanced the "totality of conditions" approach to its logical conclusion, the availability of class actions and the need to respond to specific unconstitutional prison conditions had prompted a wide range of equitable responses from the courts. Under one common injunctive technique in the prison setting, prison officials must present the court with a plan for correcting the infirmities of the institution. 13 9 Another available method uses mediation to achieve a compromise between standards desired by the inmates and the feasibility of their implementation by prison administrators and personnel. have closed or threatened to close various institutions, 14 1 but more commonly they have preferred to retain jurisdiction over the case and to require periodic progress reports. 142 In Pugh v. Locke, 143 however, in congruence with the wide range of factors contributing to the holding of unconstitutionality, the federal court interpreted its powers broadly to allow it to establish both minimum constitutional standards and a citizen's panel to monitor and supervise all penal reform in the State of Alabama. 14 4 Just as Pugh embodied the most far-ranging consideration of confinement conditions in arriving at its holding, this remedial action constituted the most expansive intrusion yet by a federal court into the management of state penal facilities. The remainder of this Part of the Article considers the propriety and desirability of this interposition of federal power into state prison affairs.
A. Pugh v. Locke: The Questionable Constitutional Bases for Its Minimum Standards
The minimum constitutional standards formulated by Chief District Judge Frank M. Johnson in Pugh v. Locke 145 are unique in many respects. For example, in only a few instances did the court allow prison officials significant latitude to develop their own remedial plans for the reformation of the Alabama prison system. 14 6 Instead, the court's standards categorically dictated not only the requisite constitutional reforms but also the mandatory implementation method. 147 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1976 ) (failure to comply with minimum standards "will necessitate the closing of those several prison facilities"); Rhem v. Malcolm, 389 F. Supp. 964, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1975 Further, the court established and delegated extensive authority to a 39-member Human Rights Committee. 150 The court empowered the committee to inspect records and facilities, to interview inmates and to hire a staff. 151 But the court described the committee's function as simply "to monitor implementation of the standards set forth in Appendix A to this decree." 15 2
In assessing Pugh's minimum standards, it is immediately apparent that many lack specific constitutional foundation. Even as a policy matter, the efficacy of the measures proposed is not clear. On the one hand, the requirement in Pugh that every inmate be furnished a storage locker and lock'1 3 might alleviate the perennial problems of thievery among inmates and illegal confiscation or destruction of inmate property by prison officials 15 4 and, in addition, might enhance an inmate's sense of personal dignity by providing a secure area for private possessions. '55 On the other hand, prison authorities might argue that such a policy would encourage the possession of contraband. 157. The Pugh standards relating to food service highlight the court's attention to arguably nonconstitutional detail. Recently, the courts have held that the constitutional prohibition The court's order regarding rehabilitation provides another illustration of its unorthodox approach to the federal judicial function. Acknowledging that "courts have thus far declined to elevate a positive rehabilitation program to the level of a constitutional right," 15 8 thePugh court nevertheless adroitly pressed the concept of "dehabilitation" into a constitutional mold, 1 5 9 noting that the lack of such programs increases the likelihood of future confinement and thus "defeat[s] the goal of rehabilitation, which prison officials have set for their institutions." 1 60 Pursuant to Chief Judge Johnson's order, prison officials must assign every inmate "a meaningful job on the basis of [his] abilities and interests ' 161 and provide prisoners with the opportunity to receive a basic education, participate in vocational training programs designed to teach a marketable skill and attend a "transitional program" prior to release. 162 The court further ordered that every prison in Alabama employ a qualified college graduate as recreational director and make space available for inmates to engage in hobbies. 163 Again, the outlines and detail of such programs, although perhaps desirable, have no firm root in the Constitution. Prior to Pugh, courts had against cruel and unusual punishment requires every inmate to be fed adequately. See, e.g., Va. 1973) . But the Pugh court mandated three meals per day with "proper eating and drinking utensils," a "food service supervisor for each institution" with a minimum of bachelor's level training in "dietetics or its equivalent" and a "registered dietician" to act as a "nutrition consultant" for the Board of Corrections, 406 F. Supp. at 334. Obviously, the eighth amendment on its face does not address the issue of prison cuisine.
Few would doubt that the Pugh food service standards are beneficial and important. "The inmate's food, besides providing the nutrients needed for optimum health, should be plentiful and well served. The food service program is of fundamental importance in the maintenance of good morale." AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STAN-DARDS 444 ( 3 d ed. 1966). But it is not so clear that the eighth amendment should bar a prison gruel that is nutritionally adequate yet monotonous in taste, color and variety, prepared by a short-order cook and served twice daily. That is, on its face, the eighth amendment does not prohibit gruel and unusual punishment. Note that the court later modified the order to require two meals per day, rather than three. James v. Wallace, Civil No. 7 4-203-N (M.D. Ala., Mar.
5, 1976).
The court further ordered that "[a]ll kitchen employees shall be trained in the handling of food and those who assist in the preparation of food shall receive training in food preparation," and that "[e]ach inmate who requires a special diet for reasons of health or religion shall be provided a diet to meet his or her individual need." 4o6 F. Supp. at 334. A motion to modify this latter requirement was denied. James v. Wallace, Civil No. gone no further than to hold that a penal system violates the eighth amendment if it operates "in such a manner that it impedes an inmate's ability to attempt rehabilitation, or simply to avoid physical, mental or social deterioration."' 6 4 Thus, the Pugh requirement arguably is as much an optimum preference as a minimum constitutional standard. 165 No aspect of conditions of prison confinement is as disconcerting as the problem of overcrowding. 1 6 6 Prison officials are obliged to supervise a burgeoning inmate population in facilities that typically are aged and inadequate. 1 67 Chief Judge Johnson not only prohibited prisons from housing additional inmates until the population did not exceed the design capacity;' 16 he also ordered the state to furnish each resident with at least 6o square feet of living space. 1 69 In that this "minimum constitutional requirement" surpasses the demands of several reform-minded model penal standards, 1 7 0 it may outstrip the dictates of desirability, and surely outdistances any past concept of "constitutional requirement."
As his order's approach to such issues as footlockers, rehabilitation and living space indicates, Chief Judge Johnson did not hesitate to carry his equitable remedial powers at least to the periphery both of the mandate of the eighth amendment and of the overall role of federal judges in adjudicat- x68. 406 F. Supp. at 332; see note 15 supra. 169. 4o6 F. Supp. at 332. The court further ordered prison administrators to equip each isolation cell with a toilet that could be flushed from the inside and a sink with hot and cold running water, and to meet United States Public Health Service Standards. Id. Each inmate also was to be allowed to bathe every other day, to receive the same toilet articles and linens as provided to the general inmate population, to have 30 minutes of outdoor exercise per day, and to have a medical examination every third day by both a physician and a "qualified mental health care professional." Id. The order regarding plumbing facilities was modified to the extent that they could be omitted from some of the punitive isolation cells for the confinement of inmates who consistently misused such facilities. James v. Wallace, Civil No. 74-203-N (M.D. Ala., Mar. 5, 1976) . With regard to living conditions generally, inmates were to be provided with toothbrushes, toothpaste, shaving cream, razors, razor blades, soap, shampoo, a comb, clean clothing, bed linen, towels, beds off the floor, and clean mattresses and blankets. 406 F. Supp. at 334. A subsequent order removed shampoo from this list of personal hygiene items. James v. Wallace, Civil No. 7 4-203-N (M.D. Ala., Mar. 5, 1976) .
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ing claims against state agencies. Yet, because he used the "totality of conditions" approach, which bases the right to relief on a conglomeration of i i considerations, Chief Judge Johnson was forced into adopting a remedy that responded to all i i considerations-a remedy that inevitably would be far ranging. It may seem ironic, nonetheless, that inmateplaintiffs who are unable to make out a constitutional cause of action based on any one prison condition in effect may receive the same relief as if they had made out and succeeded on ii such claims; it only adds to the irony that such inmates also may be entitled to a plethora of remedies that require significantly more intensive and constitutionally less obvious forms of federal court supervision over state agencies than the remedies available under any one such claim would require. One answer to this argument is that insofar as the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment covers the totality of prison conditions, the remedy for violations of that ban necessarily must intrude in that same totality. Moreover, for at least two reasons, the remedy probably will not succeed unless it attempts significantly and quite specifically to cure each of the i i offending conditions, even if, theoretically, a slighter improvement on all i i fronts would have removed the constitutional infirmity of the overall conditions of confinement. First, an effort at piecemeal or modest improvement in conditions is not likely to result in an overall improvement; ordering resources shifted to repair the leaking plumbing in one cellblock simply may result in neglect of the plumbing problems in other cellblocks. Further, in an effort to avoid overly detailed guidelines, a court order often may succumb to vague and overly broad principles of conduct that are easily ignored, evaded or misconstrued. Despite the lack of an immediately apparent constitutional basis, therefore, the remedy for a "totality of conditions" violation of the eighth amendment may have to exceed in scope and detail the sum of the remedies for any individual condition's violation.
B. Answering the Federalism Critique of Federal Judicial Supervision of State Penal Administration
Even assuming the constitutional propriety of the degree of constitutional relief afforded in Pugh, Rizzo v. Goode 1 7 1 suggests that the federalism concerns may remove the power of thefederal courts to afford that relief. In fact, on the basis of its ambitious remedy, Pugh at first appears to be a prime candidate for reversal under the federalism policy of Rizzo. Certainly the Pugh court's order is far more intrusive than the one overturned in Rizzo, which merely ordered the Philadelphia Police Department to draw up certain guidelines and submit them to the court. 1 72 Indeed, the Pugh standards are so detailed that they preclude any significant input on the part of prison officials. 173 Moreover, Pugh, like Rizzo, involved federal court intervention in certain internal affairs of a state agency that typically have been subject to a judicial "hands off' policy. 174 But Pugh may present a different case than Rizzo, one in which the constitutional violations might particularly warrant federal adjudication and relief, 1 7 1 in part because the violations are both more pervasive and more difficult to remedy. 176 The Rizzo petitioners were citizens complaining of police abuses, which, although offensive and occasionally dangerous, 177 did not immediately jeopardize life and limb. More importantly, perhaps, the citizens of Philadelphia had recourse to the ballot or, failing that, to their right to relocate to rid themselves of their tormentors. The inmates of the Alabama state prisons, on the other hand, not only lacked any potential control over, but were entirely controlled by, the objects of their complaints and could look only to the courts for relief. The Pugh standards should not be judged, then, in terms of whether any judicial intervention was called for but in terms of whetherfederal intervention and intervention in this particular Jorm are the least restrictive alternatives available for dealing effectively with these abuses. If they are, then, just as in other areas of established federal court interventionism such as the school desegregation cases, 17 8 principles of federalism may not prevent federal judicial correction of unconstitutional state action.
The striking parallels between the Pugh court's order and the one in a recent instance of federal judicial action in the desegregation area- The crux of this aspect of the problem, then, is whether that assessment was correct, or whether some less intrusive measure might have rectified that situation as well. The most obvious solution, of course, is the traditional order to state officials to draft a plan for improving conditions in the state institutions. 18 6 Although a plan of this type was invalidated in Rizzo, such a plan has fewer federalism deficiencies than the more intrusive Pugh and Morgan approaches because it leaves state personnel considerable control. It also comports better with the policy behind the "hands off" doctrine by relying on the presumed expertise of local prison adminis- trators rather than inexpert federal judges. 1 87 Nonetheless, having achieved the disappointing results noted above in using this approach in attacking inadequate medical care in the Alabama prisons, 188 Chief Judge Johnson was justified in rejecting it in Pugh. Moreover, by establishing the Human Rights Committee, he actually adopted an intermediate approach that still leaves much of the supervision and implementation of the decree in the hands of local officials 189 while laying down specific guidelines that must be met. Given Chief Judge Johnson's unsatisfactory experience with the less intrusive approach of reliance on Alabama prison officials, the Human Rights Committee provides an imaginative and workable accommodation between the principles of federalism and the need for protection of constitutional rights.
The Human Rights Committee also helps answer the related lack-ofexpertise objection to federal judicial intervention in prison affairs. The order in Pugh ensured the Committee a qualified staff' 9° and authority to "engage and consult appropriate, independent specialists."'191 To be sure, the formation and functioning of such a panel may prove to be unwieldy and expensive in practice. But when the situation requires continued oversight to guarantee compliance with the court order, an expert committee composed of members of the local community surely must be preferable to a lone federal judge with little or no experience in prison administration.
Furthermore, the federal intervention in Pugh seems just as proper as the dramatic form of its intervention, because prison officials in such states as Alabama have failed consistently to carry out their eighth and 1 4 th amendment obligation to eschew cruelly-and -unusually punishing the inmates in the prisons they control. 147-58 (1968) . This requirement on the states includes the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o, 666 (1962) . even in the ioth amendment 19 3 to avoid this or any other "obligation imposed upon them by the Constitution of the United States," 19 4 nor "to frustrate or ignore the mandates of the Constitution."' 9 ' It is precisely in such circumstances as these that the federal courts must serve as the " 'primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws and treaties of the United States.' "196 In the words of one federal appellate judge:
I look forward to the day when the State and its political subdivisions will again take up their mantle of responsibility. . . and thereby relieve the federal Government of the necessity of intervening in their affairs. Until that day arrives, the responsibility for this intervention must rest with those who through their ineptitude and public disservice have forced it. postconviction remedies would help alleviate federalism problems caused by current need to resort to federal habeas corpus for relief). One commentator has written in terms of the realities of our political process that "the Alabama Federal Intervention Syndrome . . . is the tendency of many state officials to punt their problems to the federal courts. Many federal judges have grown accustomed to allowing state officials to make political speeches as a prelude to receiving the order of the district court. This role requires the federal courts to serve as a buffer between the state officials and their constituencies, raising the familiar criticism that state officials rely upon the federal courts to impose needed reforms rather than accomplishing them themselves." McCor-Two other criticisms of federal judicial action often characterize federalism attacks on judicial interventionism: that such activism encourages potential inmate-plaintiffs to add their cases to already overburdened federal court dockets 198 and that it discourages activity by legislators who arguably are more qualified to achieve systematic prison reform. 199 The methods adopted by the Pugh court actually turn these supposed disadvantages of interventionism into advantages in the context of prison condition litigation by fostering judicial economy and providing an incentive for state officials to begin prison reform themselves.
By addressing unconstitutional conditions of confinement cumulatively and by employing committees to supervise their orders, the federal courts could function without unduly encumbering their time and energies. Traditionally, the courts have relied on case-by-case adjudication of individual prisoner complaints and on remedies limited to a particular plaintiff and very specific constitutional imperfections, in order to accomplish eighth amendment goals. But recently these complaints have accelerated in number beyond easily manageable levels. 2 0 0 By following the Pugh approach, however, courts can order a comprehensive program for remedying the totality of unconstitutional conditions. A Human Rights Committee, moreover, can provide an ongoing forum for inmate grievances without directly burdening the judicial process.
2 0 ' Such a committee might even offer a remedy mechanism for the investigation and disposition of the claims of those prisoners who prefer to petition the court for redress.
The activist trend of judicial supervision manifested in Pugh also should induce legislative and administrative action to remedy undesirable conditions of prison confinement. The Governor of Missouri, for example, recently signed into law legislation increasing state payments to county jail facilities, because "[f]ederal court decisions in Missouri have made it clear that under our United States Constitution certain jail standards must be met; otherwise, the courts may order necessary changes." 20 3 In sum, despite the precariousness of its constitutional bases and the enormity of its federal judicial involvement in state penal affairs, the remedy afforded in Pugh v. Locke represents a well-conceived and least intrusive means of effectively bringing a degree of order, sanitation, rehabilitation, and basic livability to state prisons. Moreover, that remedy may serve as the only means of effectively enforcing the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment as embodied in the developing "totality of prison conditions" doctrine. Because that doctrine, in turn, provides the only viable analytical approach to assuring that prison confinement-the most common punishment meted out to serious offenders by the states' criminal justice systems-is not cruel and unusual, the Pugh remedy may follow inexorably from a commitment seriously to pursue the mandate of the eighth amendment in the prison setting. 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cit. 1971) , the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed in part a lower court order releasing the Arkansas prison system from active judicial supervision, stating: "Based on the overall record before us, it is our firm conviction that the Arkansas correctional system is still unconstitutional. We are fully cognizant of the considerable progress which has been made by the Board of Correction with the minimal resources at hand. However, we confront a record and factual history of a sub-human environment in which individuals have been confined under the color of state law. The effort to make some amelioration of those conditions will simply not suffice. The order in Pugh also challenges an even more basic tenet of the legal system that underlies the ones discussed above: that the powers of government should be separate and distinct. 209 In particular, the judicial intervention exemplified by the remedy in Pugh raises the question of whether taking remedial action that approaches running a state prison system is a proper role for any judiciary, state or federal. Justice Harlan neatly summed up the problem when he spoke of the role of the Supreme Court:
From the beginning. . . two views as to the proper role of the Supreme Court in, our governmental system have existed ....
The one [view] is that the Court should stand ready to bring about needed basic changes in our society which for one reason or another have failed or lagged in their accomplishment by other means.
The other [view] is that such changes are at best left to the political process and should not be undertaken by judges who, as they should be because of their office, are beyond the reach of political considerations .... 210 This admonition that courts should avoid the "political thicket stated that he did not want to be remembered either for having sought "to enlarge the'judicial power beyond its proper bounds" 2 13 or for having "feared to carry it to the fullest extent duty required."-2 14
The question then becomes one of defining the proper bounds of judicial activity as determined by the "duty required." Surely the duty to interpret and enforce the Constitution looms large in the obligations of all courts, state or federal. 21 5 But that calls for some degree of certainty about just what the Constitution requires. As noted above, 2 1 6 the concept of "cruel and unusual punishment" is a difficult and changing one. On the one hand, its definition might better be left to the legislators, who are, after all, duly elected and presumably in closer touch with contemporary definitions of "cruelty." On the other hand, the eighth amendment arguably was intended to guard against precisely this sort of popular sovereignty that so easily may lead to excesses against a disfavored few. But the question is moot in cases like Pugh, in which prison conditions prompt admissions of unconstitutionality from all who review them, including the state's own defense counsel. 2 1 7 Unfortunately, many other state prison systems have not yet reached the point where the initial determination of unconstitutionality is in much dispute. In such states, the question of who should interpret the terms of the eighth amendment is considerably less important.
Given a finding of unconstitutionality, some individual or group of individuals must develop and implement a remedy. Again, some question arises as to the branch of government best fitted for the task; in this case, the choice is between the executive and the judiciary. Courts may be wise to allow prison officials to draft their own plans, reserving a supervisory role for the judiciary. If such an attempt has been made with unsatisfactory results,218 however, courts may have no alternative but to devise the plans themselves. In sum, the question of whether any court should intervene in the administration of a penal system may be answered by default.
Resolution of the questions presented by Pugh v. Locke will be difficult. Terms like "equilibrium," "duty," "rights," and "proper bounds" come easily and frequently to mind, but they are less easily and certainly less frequently defined. 219 The Pugh approach comes down on the side of 66i (196o) . Because the law deals with human conduct, it must meet changing and changeable human needs and expectations. See A. Cox, supra at 22. Even the Supreme Court has recognized the extreme mutability of supposedly immutable truths, writing that "[tlime works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes," Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (i91O), and, in the context of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, the Court has built this malleability into the law by focusing on the "evolving standards of decency." Trop v. sweeping federal intervention as a last, but viable, resort. It presents public policymakers with a distinct and difficult choice: Correct unconstitutional conditions of prison confinement at significant cost to the state government 220 or place the responsibility in the hands of the federal judiciary and effectively lose control over the management and resource allocation of the state prisons. Thus, Pugh v. Locke serves notice that unless and until the states are prepared to recognize the latent imperfections of their correctional systems, the federal courts may be compelled to take the initiative in charting the perimeters of a maturing society.
